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Rafaela Hillerbrand, Aachen / Germany 
 
Technology Assessment between Risk, Uncertainty and Ignorance 
 
Abstract: The use of most if not all technologies is accompanied by negative side effects, While we 
may profit from today’s technologies, it is most often future generations who bear most risks. Risk 
analysis  therefore  becomes  a  delicate  issue,  because  future  risks  often  cannot  be  assigned  a 
meaningful occurance probability. This paper argues that technology assessement most often deal 
with uncertainty and ignorance rather than risk when we include future generations into our ethical, 
political or juridal thinking. This has serious implications as probabilistic decision approaches are 
not applicable anymore. I contend that a virtue ethical approach in which dianoetic virtues play a 
central role may supplement a welfare based ethics in order to overcome the difficulties in dealing 
with uncertainty and ignorance in technology assessement. 
Keywords: technology assessment, climate change, ethics, risk, uncertainty, virtue, expected utility, 
decision theory, intergenerational justice 
 
`Prognoses are always  uncertain  – especially when concerning the future.' This statement 
attributed  to  W.Churchill  expresses  a  difficulty  central  to  all  ethical  theory  seeking  an 
implementation of its normative theories in moral practice. Decision making in general takes 
place under conditions of `uncertainty'.
1 The further the consequences of a decision
2 reach in 
time, the less the moral agent is able to anticipate the aftermath of this decision. Moral 
dilemmas, where obligations towards fellow human beings collide with obligations to prevent 
damage to future generations that might be very severe but whose probability of occurrence is 
presumably very low, pose a major challenge to any future ethics. Here many decisions under 
`uncertainty' cannot be transformed into certain decisions. Ethical reasoning has for the most 
part referred to a world in which morally relevant  properties of human actions are certain in 
the sense that they are both well -determined and knowable. But the `uncertainty' of future 
damage is not something trivially added to the moral exercise, and cannot be treated as a mere 
technical complication relevant only when applying an ethical theory to actual problems.  
At a first glance, two problems can be distinguished when dealing with the problem of 
`uncertainty' in a future ethics. The first, preliminary one is concerned with how the moral 
obligations towards futurity are affected by the fact that the existence of future generations as 
                                                           
1 `Uncertainty' in inverted commas denotes the colloquial use of the term; a more technical definition is given 
later in the text. . 
2 Regarding non-acting as a kind of action, we do not distinguish between the terms `action' and `decision', the 
central term in individual and social choice theory, as any conscious action is preceded by a decision. 2 
well as their preferred way of living are uncertain to the moral subject (section I). The second 
question asks, – presupposing some moral obligation towards future generations – how ethical 
reasoning and moral norms have to be modified in order to be able to cope with `uncertainties' 
which are inevitably related to the decision situation. Analyzing the term `uncertainty' in more 
detail (section II), we identify two major problems for ethical reasoning entailed in the second 
question. These are the incertitude with respect to the consequences of a decision (section III) 
and the incertitude when concerning the demarcation of a decision (section IV). It will be 
argued, that both types of `uncertainties', although closely interrelated, demand a different 
treatment. We conclude with a final summary (section IV).
 3 
 
I. Moral obligations in the light of `uncertainty' 
The  question  how  moral  norms  have  to  be  altered  in  order  to  apply  `uncertain'  decision 
situations shall be addressed in the proceeding sections. There a moral obligation towards 
future people will be presupposed. Before we are able to do this, we need to answer two 
preliminary  questions  that  are  addressed  in  subsection  1  and  2  respectively:  Does  the 
`uncertainty'  affect  the  moral  obligations  we  have  towards  futurity?  Are  certain  moral 
concepts per se unable to cope with `uncertainty'?  
 
1. Unknown number of future generations 
At first glance, impartiality in the context of a future ethics seems to imply a zero discount 
rate and thus might yield serious difficulties: The fulfilment of the (basic) needs of presently 
living people quite often touches on exhaustible resources. Assuming that future people have, 
at least to some extent, the same needs as present ones, we are facing a dilemma: We have to 
spare some resources for futurity, but it is not clear how many. Assuming, for a moment, that 
no substitutes can be generated, then if the number of future generations is indeed infinite and 
we assume zero discounting, no generation is allowed to touch on these resources. That, in 
turn, makes the resources useless for any generation. If the number of future generations is 
equal to some finite value N, under the assumption of a zero discount rate every generation is 
allowed to exploit only 1/Nth of the original resources.  
Before touching the issue of uncertainty, we want to stress, that the debate on discounting 
as it can be found mainly in economics literature has quite often not the relevance for ethical 
                                                           
3 With respect to the complexity of the problem of `uncertainty’ in the context of a future ethics, this article can 
neither yield definite solutions for the various problems it touches, nor can it give an exhaustive insight into all 
attempts proposed to treat the problems. Rather it aims at a systematic overview of problems and possible 
solutions. 3 
reasoning with which it is sometimes credited. An investigation of the discounting rate debate 
is very fruitful on its own. But as it is a topic on its own, which is in most parts not related to 
the issue of `uncertainty', we only briefly touch on it as far as it relates to our topic. It has to 
be kept in mind that the term discounting as it is used, for example, in economics, does not 
correspond  to  discounting  in  moral  theory.
4  To  be  mo re  explicit,  when  dealing  with 
discounting, we have to distinguish (a) arguments for impartiality on moral grounds from (b) 
a  pragmatic argumentation for or against a discounting of future  gains  or losses.  Such a 
pragmatic  discounting  is  justified  by  the  factual  assertiveness  of  political  guidelines.
5 
Furthermore, (c) the discounting due to   diminishing marginal utility as it is widely used in 
economics and (d) a discounting of future market values have to be distinguished from ethical 
arguments that give rise to impartiality. While the discounting of the diminishing marginal 
utility can be justified by psychological assumptions of the decreasing satiability of goods due 
to  increasing avaiability, the discounting of future market values  is the result of certain 
assumptions about  the evolution of the actual interest rate and of the growth rate of the  
economy.
6 
Although considerations made, for example, about discounting in economy might to 
some extend be of use for ethical considerations and vice versa, the four kinds of discounting 
are clearly to be distinguished. Thus, the first impression as it was outlined at the beginning of 
this subsection might be misleading: Various aspects arising in (c) and (d) might justify a 
positive discounting of  goods  and market values, but this is not necessarily in contradiction 
to impartiality between generations.   
In reality, the moral agent has no  definite information on the actual number N of how 
many future generations will actually exist. So he does not even know ho w much he should, 
on moral grounds, save for future people. Does this affect his moral obligation towards 
futurity? This question was addressed by Dasgupta and Heal in the framework of decision 
theory.
7 Dasgupta's and Heal's argumentation is based on the a ssignment of some subjective 
probability
8  to the number N of existing future generations, that is: We assign a finite 
                                                           
4 Birnbacher, Dieter, Brudermüller, Gert, Zukunftsverantwortung und Generationensolidarität, 2001, 117-136 
5 Lind, Robert C., Reassessing the Government’s Discount Rate Policy in the Light of New Theory and Data in a 
World Economy with a High Degree of Capital Mobility,  Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 18 (1990), 24 
6 Birnbacher, Dieter, Brudermüller, Gert, Zukunftsverantwortung und Generationensolidarität, 2001, 122, 129-
132 
7 Dasgupta, P.S., Heal, G.M., Economic theory and exhaustible resources, 1995 
8 In this article the term `probability theory' is reserved for a formal account like the one given by Kolmogorov in 
1931. Therefore we distinguish the (axiomatic)  probability p from a measurable  frequency pN  which is 
determined via N repetitions of the same setting (e.g. tossing of a coin) in real experiments or numerical 
simulations. Furthermore, a subjective probability ρ acts as a more or less sophisticated guess of p in cases where 
frequency approximations are not available or very unreliable. 4 
probability ρ
(N) to the extinction of mankind after N generations. The authors argued that a 
ρ
(N) different from zero gives, under some additional assumptions, rise to a positive pure 
discount  rate.  These  assumptions  are  very  far  reaching  -  a  summary  of  the  criticism  on 
Dasgupta's and Heal's derivation can be found in Ponthiere.
9 Of course, rejecting Dasgupta's 
and Heal's derivation cannot put an end to the debate on discounting. But we want to point out 
that the discounting debate as it is based on the possible extinction of mankind after some 
unknown number of generations, quite often lacks implications for real life situations. Take, 
as an example, problems connected to the finiteness of our petroleum resources or the 
radiation  risks  from  radioactive  waste  products.  According  to  present  knowledge,  our 
petroleum supplies will last for approximately another 50 years if the present consumption is 
extrapolated, while for example Plutonium in radioactive waste products has a half life of 
about 25 thousand years and thus constitutes a major threat for human beings for roughly the 
same order of magnitude. Bearing in mind that the oldest fossils are attributed to (biological 
moderne) man are 160 thousand years old, and that other species such as some dinosaurs lived 
for around 50 million years, these time spans seem too short to sensibly assign a probability 
different from zero to the extinction of mankind within this time.  According to these values it 
is not to be expected that the discounting debate based on a finite probability for the 
extinction of mankind leads, at least for the urgent problems in place,  to any other results as 
when deciding upon a zero discount rate. Thus the discussion about discounting in the light of 
an `uncertain' number of future generations seems academic.   
 
2. Uncertain preferences of future people 
Setting aside the problem of discounting does not help us to get rid of the dilemma as it was 
described at the beginning of the proceeding subsection. It might be that, as in the case of 
petroleum  reserves,  saving  an  equal  amount  even  for  a  very  small  number  N  of  future 
generations, the resources left over for any generations are too few as to fulfill their needs. 
Thus,  within  a  discussion  on  moral  grounds  where  we  want  to  stick  to  the  maxime  of 
impartiality, the problem we face is a real moral dilemma and we need to treat it as such.   
Resolving such moral dilemmas seems to be a central issue of any future ethics. With 
respect  to  balancing  the  various  obligations  it  has  been  argued  by  various  authors  that 
consequentialist approaches are superior to others.
10 In particular, welfare-based approaches 
                                                           
9 Ponthiere, Gregory, Should we Discount Future Generations' Welfare? A Survey on the 'Pure' Discounting Rate 
Debate, CREPP Working Paper, 2003 
10 Patzig, Günther, Der Unterschied zwischen subjektiven und objektiven Interessen und seine Bedeutung für die 
Ethik, in: Gesammelte Schriften 1, ed. Günther Patzig, 1994, 80. 5 
seem at a first glance to be particularly well suited to coping with moral dilemmas in the 
context  of  a  future  ehics.
11  Nonetheless,  welfare-based  approaches  such  as  classical 
utilitarianism or preferential utilitarianism, that take into account (at least in principle) all the  
preferences of the people a specific decision touches on, face serious problems in the context 
of a future ethics. People's preferences are determined by a variety of circumstances – such as 
the  natural  environment,  technical  developments,  and  the  structure  of  society.  Thus 
influencing the preferences of future people or determining them on basis of (sophisticated) 
estimates on future people’s living conditions, is only possible if at all, in a very restricted 
way.  
 
 
Fig. 1: Derivation of normative instructions. “=>” reads `yields as output', ``→'' reads `is used as input for'. 
Note that on both levels `uncertainties' may enter. 
 
In  a  consequentialist  approach,  moral  reasoning  has,  given  a  specific  scenario
12, to 
evaluate the consequences of a specific decision. The consequences entail `uncertainties' due 
to the prognosis they are based on. In an ethical assessment based on welfare approaches, 
additional `uncertainties' come into play because future people’s preferences are not known in 
detail. These kind of `uncertainties' introduced on the last level in fig.1 have to be clearly 
distinguished from the ones on the upper level, introduced by the prognoses on the actual 
outcomes  of  a  decision  which  are  subject  of  a  latter  section:  While  we  can  discuss  the 
question  of  how  to  react  to  the  latter  within  the  framework  of  some  ethical  theory,  the 
`uncertainty' that enters on the level of ethical assessment itself might make the whole concept 
of  a  welfare  based  approach  inconsistent:  It  is  not  clear  how  we  can  satisfy  Bentham's 
principle `Everybody to count for one and nobody for more than one',
13 that is, how to take 
into account the preferences of all persons, future as well as present, in the same way , while 
                                                           
11 For example, according to the reasoning of the authors mentioned in the main body of the text, welfarism is 
based on fewer premises than other consequentialist approaches. In the context of a future ethics it is 
advantageous to keep the number of premises used to derive moral norms low, as we can expect that the higher 
the number of premises, the fewer generations are able to agree on these norms. 
12 A definition of `scenario’is given in section II. 
13Harrison, Ross 1993, Democracy, London/New York, 177. 6 
on the one hand we know (at least to some extend) the preferences of presently living people, 
while on the other hand, the detailed preferences of future people are in principle unknown.
14  
The question of how to determine the preferences that have  to be taken into account in 
welfare-based ethics is highly under debate even in an intragenerational context. Nonetheless, 
the problem becomes significantly more severe in the context of a future ethics as the 
uncertainties on future people's preferences i ncrease with time. A proposed way of how to 
determine  the  preferences  relevant  for  ethical  reasoning  that  can  be  extended 
straightforwardly from the intra-  to the intergenerational case was originally proposed by 
J.St.Mill:  The preferences relevant for ethical assessment are identified with the ones which 
an omniscient and experienced person would have. This approach, however, has been argued 
to  be  circular  or  to  yield  an  infinite regress.    Other suggestions  of  how to  determine 
preferences relevant for ethical assessment, such as the ones based on representative opinion 
polls as suggested by G.Patzig, cannot be extended to a future ethics.
15 
If  we  nevertheless  want  to  obey  Bentham's  principle  of  procedural  equality,  the 
preferences taken into account in moral reasoning have to restrict to those which are basic in 
that sense that (a) all human beings as such share them and (b) their fulfillment is a  necessary 
condition for living an (according to individual criteria) good life – such as the  need for 
sleep, nutrition  or some kind of security. A similar argumentation was given by J.Rawls in an 
intragenerational ethics: When choosing a constitution, the preferences taken into account 
have  to  restrict  to  interests  in  so-called  `primary  goods'  which  obey  (a)  and  (b).
16  In 
accordance with Rawls we hold the opinion that the primary interests are not merely restricted 
to physical interest aimed purely at the maintenance of live. But we do not follow Rawls' 
determination of `primary goods' in context: It has been argue d in the literature that Rawls' 
`primary goods' are not invariant under different economical and social systems und thus 
interests in these `primary goods' do not obey (a) and (b).
17 The criticism raised against Rawls 
holds also for the extension of his theory of justice to intergenerational ethics, as it is done by 
B.Singer.
18 
                                                           
14 Further problems that utilitarian ethics face in the context of a future ethics when the number of generations 
tends to infinity, but which are not primarily related to `uncertainty’ are discussed in Liedekerke/Lauwers (1997) 
and in Lauwers/Vallentyne (2004). 
15 Patzig, Günther, Der Unterschied zwischen subjektiven und objektiven Interessen und seine Bedeutung für die 
Ethik, in: Gesammelte Schriften 1, ed. Günther Patzig, 1994, 93 
16 Rawls John, Social Unity and Primary Goods, in: Utility and Beyond, ed. A. K. Sen, B. Williams, 1982, 161 
17 See e.g. De-Shalit, Avner, Contractarian Theories of Intergenerational Justice, in: Why Posterity Matters. 
Environmental Policies und Future Generations, ed. A. De-Shalit., 1995, 102f. as one of  many authors involved 
in this field. 
18 Singer, Brent A., An Extension of Rawls' Theory of Justice to Environmental Ethics, Environment Ethics 
10(3) (1988), 217-231 
 7 
The reduction of the preferences which have to be taken into account in ethical reasoning 
on such basic or primary interests which are the necessary prerequisites for any human being 
to  be  able  to  live  a,  according  to  individual  criteria,  `good'  life,  implies  that  the  present 
generation as well as future ones have to accept a cut in their standard of living: For example, 
even known preferences of present people cannot be taken into account in order not to violate 
the principle of procedural equality.
19   
 
II. Incorporating `uncertainties' in ethical reasoning 
For the remainder of the article we assume a moral obligation to take into account the needs 
of future people in the same way as the needs of our fellow human beings. But raising the 
question on the morally right behaviour under `uncertainty' in the demotic meaning of the 
word  resembles  opening  Pandora's  box.  An  analysis  of  the  colloquial  use  of  the  term 
`uncertainty' shall make it accessible to a systematic treatment (2.1). The different kinds of 
`uncertainties' we will identify are illustrated at a specific example, the man-made greenhouse 
effect (2.2).
20 
 
1. A typology of `uncertainty' 
The following classification of `uncertainty' with regard to context follows loosely Hansson 
1996 and distinguishes three kinds of `uncertainties', namely `incertitude of consequences', 
`incertitude of demarcation', and `incertitude of reliability'. 
Incertitude of consequences: Quite often the outcomes of the various decision options are 
not clear to the decision maker. This might be due to the fact that information which might 
influence the knowledge of consequences of a decision is not available or is on such a scale 
that it cannot be assessed adequately by the agent within the time the decision has to be taken. 
This can be due to (i) contingent features of the specific situation. But there may also be (ii) 
limitations  in  principle  to  obtaining  such  information:  The  future  course  of  environment, 
societies, technologies, etc., is to a large extent unknown to the moral subject at the time of 
the decision, but will also codetermine its  consequences. Furthermore there are situations 
where (iii) the decision touches systems that do not allow for certain predictions: Complex 
systems as the climate system or sociological systems entail feedback processes and therefore 
–  although  the  underlying  dynamics  is  purely  deterministic  –  cannot  be  predicted  with 
                                                           
19 The problems related to the excessive demands of utilitarian approaches in the context of a future ethics are 
thus not resolved by restricting the morally relevant preferences to those that are ‘basic’.  
20 In accordance with the technical literature, the term `greenhouse effect' refers to the fact that due to the 
existence of so-called (natural and man-made) greenhouse gases in the troposphere, there is less thermal 
radiation retransmitted from Earth into space. 8 
certainty as they might exhibit chaotic behaviour. At least with respect to (ii) and (iii), the 
higher the predicted time scale, the higher are the incertitudes related to that prognosis. Thus 
the incertitude of consequences constitutes a severe problem in particular in the context of a 
future ethics. 
 
Incertitude of demarcation: Any analysis of a specific decision must start with some 
demarcation of the decision itself. Facing actual decisions, the incertitude of demarcation can 
be twofold: (i) Assuming the general purpose of the decision is well determined, it can still be 
unclear  whether  all  the  available  options  have  been  identified.  As  for  the  incertitude  of 
consequences, this constitutes a problem in principle as for many decisions future research 
might find new ways of how to act. Thus one can never be sure to have identified all the 
possible decision options. Furthermore, (ii) not in every decision situation is it established 
how to determine the `decision horizon'
21: The scope of the decision or even which problem 
the decision is supp osed to solve might be unclear. Using natural language with all its 
counterfactual assertions that refer to future and past events, the various options of how to 
decide in a given situation are such that `a person has only one decision to make in his whole  
life. He must, namely, decide how to live, and this he might in principle do once and for all'.
22 
Hence the actual decision horizon would be infinite. Nevertheless, in order to be able to make 
any decision, one has to restrict the decision horizon. The further in time the consequences of 
our decisions lie, the higher is the incertitude of demarcation.  This second incertitude of 
consequences as well cannot be eliminated in principle, as any decision has to be taken in a 
finite  amount  of  time.  Thus  in  the  fie ld  of  (applied)  ethical  reasoning  we  are  always 
confronted with the question as how to determine the decision horizon – not because there is a 
moral reason for treating different people in a different way (this argument was indeed subject 
of section I), but simply because they cannot be treated in the same way due to features of the 
decision situation itself. 
 
Incertitude of reliance: In many cases it is not clear, if the available information which is 
necessary to determine the consequences, the available options, as well as the horizon of a 
certain decision is at all reliable. It might be difficult or even impossible for the moral subject 
to  determine  whether  the  people  providing  it  are  themselves  reliable,  whether  the  used 
methodology  is  subject  to  doubt,  or  even  how  to  determine  the  relevant  scientists  for 
obtaining the information. This is a severe problem especially when we are concerned with 
                                                           
21 Hansson, Sven O., Decision Making under Great Uncertainty, Philosophy of Social Science 26(3) (1996), 371 
22 Savage, Leonard J., The Foundations of Statistics, 1954, 83 9 
the remote future: Modern techniques and technologies have significantly raised our ability to 
influence the living conditions in the remote future. Therefore, `uncertainties' of the prognosis 
quite often arise when concerning a morally adequate relationship to modern technics and 
technologies. Here the moral agents crucially depend on the information given by experts.   
How to deal with the various incertitudes identified here – how to take into account of 
the uncertain consequences of a decision, how to deal with an unfinished list of decision 
options as well as with a finite decision horizon, and how to estimate the reliability of the 
available data - constitute major challenges for ethical reasoning in the context of a future 
ethics. 
 
2. `Uncertain' decisions: an example 
Before  proceeding  further  we  want  to  illustrate  the  three  types  of  incertitudes  and  their 
interrelation  by  the  morally  relevant  problems  arising  from  man-made  emissions  of 
greenhouse gases. Firstly, we focus on the origin of the incertitude of consequences. Most of 
the  time,  prognoses  that  policy  makers,  for  example,  face  when  dealing  with  `uncertain' 
impacts of present-day actions on future generations are the results of rather complicated 
analyses. The arising of incertitudes of consequences is illustrated in fig.2 for the greenhouse 
effect. In a similar fashion this scheme can be extended to other prognoses on the long-term 
effects  of  present  actions.  Concerning  our  example,  the  consequences  of  an  enhanced 
greenhouse  effect  due  to  man-made  emissions  of  greenhouse  gases  are  largely  unclear. 
Possible aftermaths range from a severe global warming through hardly any changes to a 
cooling down of parts of the globe. This incertitude is due to shortcomings of present climate 
models as well as to the fact that the climate system entails feedback processes (middle plane 
in fig.2). Further `uncertainties' about future energy-, socio-, and economic-political decisions 
estimated  in  so-called  `energy  scenarios'  (upper  plane)  enter  in  prognoses  on  the  future 
climate. The mere fact that there is a rise in the average annual temperature, as climate models 
might indicate, is of no use for an ethical investigation of actions releasing greenhouse gases. 
Important for ethics are the implications of such climate changes for the natural environment 
(such  as  a  rise  in  sea  level)  and  its  consequences  for  future  people  (e.g.  via  changed 
cultivation  conditions  for  crops).  Via  so-called  `impact  models'  which  estimate  these 
implications (third plane in fig.2) additional incertitudes of consequences come into play.
23  
Between the various levels there are feedback processes, which  are very hard to take into 
consideration.    
                                                           
23 Nordhaus, William D., Boyer, Joseph, Requiem for Kyoto: an economic analysis of the Kyoto protocol, The 
Energy Journal, Special Issue (1999), 93-130 10 
 
Fig. 2: Estimation of consequences of man-made emissions of greenhouse gases  (following 
Schönwiese/Diekmann 1989). For an explanation of the symbols, see fig. 1. 
 
Concerning the incertitude of demarcation, we note that it seems to be a general feature 
that various interest groups have different opinions on the decision horizon. It is under debate 
as  to  whether  a  possibly  man-made  climate  change  can  be  discussed  independently  of 
problems connected to the use of energy resources whose usage emits no greenhouse gases, 
such as nuclear power. Discussing nuclear waste disposal, one might ask whether we do or do 
not have to take into account that future generations might be incapable of reading records on 
the waste disposal while, at the same time, there will have been no other information transfer 
from one generation to the next on the subject of nuclear waste disposal. We can continue 
with  an  infinite  list  of  related  questions.  Concerning  the  first  kind  of  incertitude  of 
demarcation as it shows up in connection with a man-made greenhouse effect, we note that it 
is not at all clear whether there are yet unknown means as to how to compensate for or adapt 
to (severe) climate changes.  
The  problem  the  moral  agent  encounters  when  estimating  the  reliability  of  the 
information needed for the ethical evaluation of the forecasts given on the last plane in fig.2, 
is expressed lucidly by the German Umweltbundesamt which states (Umweltbundesamt 2003, 
my translation): `Concerning the present climate debate the layman seems to be incapable of 
judging whether a report really emanates from a research with adequate quality standards or if 
it  represents  only  some  ``story''.'  Present  climate  models  are  not  well  established,  and 
especially  the  methodology  used  in  impact  models  –  for  example  the  monetarization  of 
`utility' in so-called Willingness-to-Pay approaches as they are used by Nordhaus and Boyer
24 
- is subject to doubt. Not only for the greenhouse e ffect, but for many prognoses relevant in 
the factual political decision making process, prognoses on the long-term impacts of decisions 
comprise the forecasts of scientists in various fields. The scientists working on the different 
                                                           
24 Nordhaus, William D., Boyer, Joseph, Requiem for Kyoto: an economic analysis of the Kyoto protocol, The 
Energy Journal, Special Issue (1999), 93-130 11 
`levels'  have  to  rely  crucially  on  the  data  of  the  preceding  plane.  As  cooperation  is  rare 
between  scientists  working  on  different  levels  and  in  general  a  common  terminology  is 
missing, it might be very hard even for the scientist himself to assess the reliability of his 
`own' data.  
 
III. The applicability of decision theory 
Proceeding further by closing Pandora's box, we begin the investigation of how the problem 
of `uncertainties' can be treated within ethical reasoning concerned with future generations 
by restricting to the incertitude of consequences. Acting on a suggestion already given by 
F.H.Knight in his classical book on `uncertainty', we specify the incertitude of consequences 
according to its `degree' (3.1).
25 The incertitude of consequences is treated systematically in 
the framework of decision theory and risk analysis.
26 By means of two paradigmatic models 
of decision theory it shall be discussed, if and how such models can be used as a tool in moral 
philosophy concerning the remote future for actio ns under risk (3.2), uncertainty (3.3), and 
ignorance (3.4). 
 
1. `Uncertain' consequences - a classification 
Following  the  nomenclature  which  is  used  in  ethics  of  technology,  we  distinguish  three 
different  kinds  of  incertitude  of  consequences:  Risk  is  defined  as  a  setting  in  which  all 
possible outcomes of the decision are known and can be assigned some frequency pN which 
offers  some  confident  estimate  of  the  occurrence  probability  p  of  the  corresponding 
outcome.
27 Uncertainty is defined by a setting in which again the whole set of outcomes is 
known but  not  for all outcomes  can one assign the corresponding frequencies. Situations 
where one lacks knowledge not only on the probabilities, but on (part of) the outcomes too, 
are called decisions under  ignorance. Due to the dominance of what is often referred to as 
`Bayesian  theory'  the  distinction  between  the  three  cases,  namely,  decisions  under  risk, 
uncertainty and ignorance, was abandoned by many economists and philosophers. Yet the 
generality and simplicity of the Bayesian approach, which makes it popular in many fields, as 
well  as  the  somewhat  artificial  boundary  between  decisions  under  risk,  uncertainty,  and 
                                                           
25 Knight, Frank H., Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, 1984, 19 
26 We do neither aim at an overview of the various, sophisticated models used in both fields, nor do we want to 
give an exhaustive insight into the various critiques raised against those. For reviews on decision theory see e.g. 
Jeffrey, Richard C., The Logic of Decision, 1983 or, for a non-mathematical introduction, Hansson, Sven O., 
Decision theory. A Brief introduction, 1994. Commemorating the discussion in section 1, the morally relevant 
preferences that determine the utilities relevant in the decision theoretical models are those that have been 
defined as ‘basic’. 
27 Leitner, Rupert, Responsibility and uncertainty, Newsletter. Akademie-Brief  der Europäischen Akademie zur 
Erforschung wissenschaftlich-technischer Entwicklungen 50 (2004), 1-3 12 
ignorance, should not distract from the fact that this distinction is of great importance for 
ethical  considerations.  Therefore  the  terminology  used  in  decision  theory,  that  blurs  the 
differences between a frequency and a subjectivist approach to probabilities (e. g. Luce/Raiffa 
1957, 13), is inadequate for ethical reasoning. 
 
Actual situations quite often entail elements of risk, uncertainty, and ignorance: There is 
a more or less continuous gradation of incertitudes of consequences running from the ideal 
case (choices under certainty) to complete ignorance. Classifying a certain decision situation 
as a situation under risk, uncertainty or ignorance, is somewhat arbitrary. Here the second 
kind of incertitude of demarcation comes into play: The wider the chosen decision horizon, 
for  example,  the  more  likely  we  face  a  decision  under  ignorance;  narrowing  down  the 
decision horizon, we will encounter a risky situation. Although incertitude of consequences 
and of demarcation are thus interrelated, the two are conceptually different. In order to make 
the  problem  of  `uncertainty'  analyzable  despite  this  interrelation  of  the  incertitude  of 
demarcation and the incertitude of consequences, we define the term `scenario' as a set of 
decision options where the classification to risk, uncertainty or ignorance is well determined.  
 
2. Decisions under risk 
Decision theory summarizes the various factors which determine the outcomes of a decision 
but which are not under the control of the agent in so-called `states of nature'. Concerning 
decisions under risk, each of these states can be assigned some definite frequency. One can 
distinguish  roughly  between  two  kinds  of  decision  models:  The  first  makes  use  of  the 
approximations  of  the  probabilities,  which  denote  the  likelihood  of  occurrence  for  the 
uncontrollable states of nature. The other approach, so-called `elementary decision theory 
models', makes no use of these probabilities. In 3.2.1 we discuss ` Expected  Utility  Theory' 
(EUT) as a simple example for a probabilistic decision model, since a large number of models 
developed for decision making under risk and uncertainty can be regarded as variations or 
generalizations of EUT.
28 To exemplify an elementary decision model, we discuss in 3.2.2 the 
so-called maximin criterion, since this is a fairly popular approach in future ethics. 
 
   
                                                           
28 e.g. Bell, David E., Regret in Decision Making under Uncertainty, Operations Research, 30 (1982), 961-981 // 
Kahneman, Damiel, Tversky, Amos, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions under Risk, in: Decision, 
Probability, and Utility, ed. P.Gärdenfors, N.-E. Sahlin, 1988, 183-214 // Loomes, Graham, Sugden, Robert, 
Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice under certainty, Economic Journal 92 (1982), 805-
824 13 
a) Expected Utility Theory 
In many fields dealing with risk or uncertainty analysis, EUT can be regarded as state of the 
art. The idea behind EUT is to extend the definition of rational decisions under certainty, 
where  the  objects  of  choice  are  the  possible  distributions  x
(k)  of  some  commodities,  to 
decisions  where  the  outcomes  are  uncertain.  In  the  latter  case  the  objects  of  choice  are 
identified as probabilities or `lotteries' over outcomes.
29 The outcomes themselves consist 
again in a distribution of commodities. In analogy to the  certain case, a rational preference 
ranking of person i can be represented by a real valued preference function V i depending on 
the probabilities pk assigned by the lottery to the outcome of `winning' a specific distribution 
x
(k). Denoting with uk the `utility' that person i gets when the outcome x
(k) of the lottery 
occurs, EUT assumes that the individual preference function is given by the expectation value 
of the `utilities' uk,  
 
    Vi(p) = Σk uk pk .        (1) 
 
Hence the name `expected utility theory'. As in the certain case a `rational' individuum is 
modelled as if trying to maximize the value of Vi(p) over the currently available set P of 
possible lotteries. 
In order to make the transition from individual to social choice theory, one might follow 
J. Harsanyi's approach
30 that implies that the overall social welfare function W(p) is given by 
a linear function of the individuals' personal preference functions Vi(p): 
 
W(p) = Σi Vi (p) .          (2) 
 
According to Harsanyi, morally correct behaviour maximizes the thus obtained W over a 
given P. Assuming the number of individuals in eqn. (2) to be fixed, the overall social welfare 
function for lotteries is given by the arithmetic mean of the individuals' welfare functions 
Vi(p) just as for classical utilitarian theories in the certain case. 
 
                                                           
29 Luce, Duncan R., Raiffa, Howard, Games and decisions, 1957, 24 
30 Harsanyi, John C., Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Ranking, Journal of 
Political Economy 61 (1953), 434 / Harsanyi, John C., Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics and Interpersonal 
Comparison of Utility, Journal of Political Economy 63 (1955), 309-321 / Harsanyi, John C., Nonlinear Social 
Welfare Functions”, Theory and Decision 6 (1975), 311-332 14 
In order to analyze the applicability of EUT to problems encountered in a future ethics, 
let us focus only on the personal preference function, leaving ethical arguments apart for the 
moment and consider solely the `rationality' of the expected utility approach. 
Adequacy of probabilistic models: 
31 Concerning any probabilistic decision model it has 
been argued that decisions might not be irrational even when they contradict the model.
32 For 
example, nuclear physics can on a probabilistic basis determine the time after which half of a 
given probe has decayed only if the probe contains a  sufficiently large number of nuclei. It is 
not possible to make any forecast on the behaviour of one or a few specific nuclei. Just the 
same, a probabilistic decision model has to assume that the decision under consideration is 
repeated sufficiently often: Assuming we have a reliable probabilistic decision model suitable 
for a specific problem, then acting against it could be regarded as irrational when the same 
decision is taken many times. But decisions touching future generations are often political 
positions  of  points  taken  only  once.  This  is  the  case  when  deciding  about  the  permitted 
amount of CFC or greenhouse gas emissions, the permission of experiments in the field with 
genetically modified plants, etc.  
 
Adequacy of EUT: Concentrating on the long-term effects of a decision, we want to add a 
critique on the functional form of the individual's preference function as it is supposed by 
EUT in equation (1). Although at a first glance it might seem reasonable to base decisions on 
the expectation value of the utility, this is indeed not the case, at least not for decision under 
risk:
33  Probability densities yielding the same expectation value may have very different 
probabilities for the occurrence of `extreme' events far away from the mean for example. As a 
simple example we consider a case in which personal well -being is directly (negatively) 
correlated to the (rare) occurrence of wind gusts, where the wind speed changes rapidly over a 
small time interval. If the underlying probability density of changes of wind speed over a 
                                                           
31 The argument as it is sketched in the text holds only for a frequentist's interpretation of probabilities. It is 
basically a reformulation of the so-called `central limit theorem'. It states averaging long enough – for example, 
taking large time averages – yields  on average a measured value equal to the mean. A single measurement 
however is not necessarily equal to the mean even when the central limit theorem holds. The criticism 
concerning the applicability of EUT (see main text below),  shows that indeed in many cases the central limit 
theorem is not even applicable and even when considering large averages we might have, on average, deviations 
from the mean. 
32 Hansson, Sven O., Ethical criteria of risk acceptance, Erkenntnis, 59 (2003), 291-309 / Hansson, Sven O., 
What is philosophy of risk?, Theoria.62 (1996), 169-186 
Hansson, Sven O., Decision Making under Great Uncertainty, Philosophy of Social Science 26(3) (1996), 369-
386 / Hansson, Sven O., The False Promise of Risk Analysis, Ratio 6 (1993), 16-26 // Agarwala, B.K., In 
Defence of the Use of Maximin Principle of Choice under Uncertainty in Rawls' Original Position, Indian 
Philosophical Quarterly 8(2), (1986) 169 
33 In our analysis we assume for simplicity a continuous distribution of commodities. The transition to a discrete 
distribution as it is used in equation (1) is straightforward. 15 
fixed time interval were Gaussian with the same mean as the actual density, the gusts that are 
actually measured every hour would be expected to occur once a century.
34 An individual 
welfare function that restricts itself to the expected utility seems insufficient since it does not 
distinguish between these two cases. In general, many decisions  touch on complex systems 
and in particular their long-term consequences are determined by their effects on the evolution 
of these systems. Recent investigations of such complex systems – ranging from geophysical 
data, like frequencies of wind gusts, earthquakes, or flood disasters, to many financial data 
like price changes in some time interval – reveal the importance of taking into account the full 
form of the probability density, that is, not only its first moment like in EUT, but all higher 
moments  as  well  have  to  be  considered.  The  importance  of  taking  into  account  the  full 
probability density becomes more pronounced when long-time periods are considered: If the 
underlying limiting probability density is non-Gaussian as it is, for example, in the case of the 
occurence of wind gusts, then the more often a stochastic event occurs (e.g. when taking 
longer time averages), the more  frequently extreme events that deviate from the mean occur. 
Thus  deviations  form  Gaussian  limiting  distributions  become  particular  important  with 
regards to the remote future.
35 
 
Moral objections: Taking the individual's personal and social preference functions to be 
linear in p, has been criticized in this article for being unable to treat the complexity of many 
decisions  adequately.  In the past,  the linearity  of the social  preference function has  been 
subject to a lot of attacks based on moral grounds as well - not to mention the important 
contributions of Diamond and Sen here.
36 It has been argued that the linearity of the social 
preference function is in contradiction with some sentiment of justice of moral subjects.
37 
Theses critiques aimed mainly at undermining the specific form of W. We do not want to go 
into detail on that discussion and the proposed solutions, since these are not specific for 
decision under `uncertainty'. In fact, they contribute mainly to the gene ral discussion on 
                                                           
34 Böttcher, F., Barth. S., Peinke,J., Stoch. Environ. Res. Risk Assess. 21, 299 (2007). 
35 There are various approaches discussed mainly in the framework of Bayesianism that qualify as such decision 
models taking into account higher moments and that can be extended to decisions under risk as they are defined 
here. See, for example, Campbell, H.R., Liechty, J., Liechty, M.W., Mueller, P., Portfolio selection with higher 
order moments, 2004 and references therein. But neither for probability densities for which the second or even 
the first moment does not exist nor for intermittent distributions, there exists at present a satisfactory decision 
models. As these probability densities seem to appear rather often, this is an open problem presently discussed in 
the so-called `Fat Tail'-community (e.g. Embrechts/Klüppelberg/Mikosch 2001). 
36 Diamond, Peter A., Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparison of Utility: 
Comment, Journal of Political Economy 75 (1967), 765-766 // Sen, Amartya, Rationality and Uncertainty, 
Theory and Decision 18 (1985), 109-127 
37 Diamond, Peter A., Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparison of Utility: 
Comment, Journal of Political Economy 75 (1967), 765 16 
distributional justice.
38 But taking into account that a decision function based solely on the 
expectation value is inadequate for individual decisions, it does not qualify as a basis for the 
derivation of a social decision function. 
 
b) Maximin strategy 
As an example for an elementary, which is non-probabilistic decision model, we will discuss 
the maximin model. According to maximin, for all decision options one shall choose the 
worst possible outcome and settle for the decision that yields the best of these worst options, 
that is:  Maximize the minimal utility that one obtains when the worst case occurs. For social 
choice  in  the  context  of  future  ethics,  the  optimal  decision  according  to  maximin  was 
formulated most strikingly by H. Jonas: `The prophecy of doom must take priority over the 
prophecy of bliss.'
39 
 
For decisions under risk, maximin neglects a lot of the available information. If the 
worst-case scenario is not due to happen, the outcome of the decision might be far from 
optimal.  Take for example a disease that is likely to be caught with some very small 
probability p0 and might with some finite, but very small probability p1 lead to death. An 
available vaccination has the disadvantage that it yields with some rather large probability p2 
>> p1 and p2 >> p0 to deafness.  Maximin would settle for option of vaccination, but – looking 
at the way vaccinations against life-threatening diseases are actually administered in Europe – 
this is not the way people really act. Of course, empirical results on how people behave imply 
nothing about the rationality or the morally correctness of this behaviour. Nonetheless, such a 
discrepancy might indicate that the maxime is not in accordance with the moral intuition of 
rational individuals. Therefore, most authors who opt for maximin in the context of decision 
under risk, do so only when `the survival and humanity of man' is endangered by one of the 
possible decision outcomes. This is the case for Jonas
40 and for Birnbacher on the level of 
norms for real moral agents.
41 Jonas and Birnbacher settle for maximin for different reasons: 
For decisions under risk, Jonas would recur on a teleological interpretation  of nature, while 
                                                           
38 See, for example, the monograph edited by Allais and Hagen (1979). 
39 Jonas, Hans, The imperative of responsibility: In search of an ethics for the technological age, 1984, 255 
40 Jonas' paradigm is indeed not decision under risk, but decision under ignorance. But his argumentation for an 
`Imperative of Responsibility' is twofold: Jonas’ methodological argumentation (see 3.3) - based on the fact that 
future course of technical inventions and scientific research cannot be predicted - does, of course, not apply in 
the contest of decision under risk. Nonetheless, Jonas' second, metaphysical-religious argument, as it is 
embraced in the main part of Jonas, Hans, The imperative of responsibility: In search of an ethics for the 
technological age, 1984 applies even to decisions under risk. 
41 These are the so-called `Praxisnormen' that parallel Hare's `second-level principles' or norms on an `intuitive 
level'. 17 
Birnbacher  argues  for  an  `heuristic  of  fear'  because  real  addressees  of  moral  norm  have 
cognitive as well as motivational deficits.
42 But even with this restriction to decisions where 
the existence of human kind is endangered, maximin as a guiding rule for decisions under risk 
faces serious problems. 
 
Moral dilemmas: Maximin is not able to treat all moral dilemmas that appear in a future 
ethics.  One  might  have  to  decide  between  two  policies,  both  of  them  yielding  the  same 
cardinal harm, but with significantly different probabilities. For example, settling for any of 
these policies leads with finite probability to the extinction of man. On the basis of maximin 
alone, we cannot decide whether to settle for the option where the probability of extinction is 
much lower than in the other or not. 
 
Consistency: The `worst case' might be determined not only by the threat of harm on 
(future) people, but also by the number of people who are harmed. In decisions under risk the 
latter  might  be  codetermined  by  the  probabilities  associated  with  that  event.  Under  such 
circumstances a non-probabilistic decision model is not only unsatisfactory, it is even not 
consistent. Imagine we have the choice between two energy policies, one settling for the use 
of nuclear power plants, the other uses conventional forms of energy.
  43 The first decision 
option has the disadvantage that with some finite probability p0  there will be a major leak of 
nuclear radiation. This leads with p1 to the death of a person located at some distance from the 
power plant. In the second case, we have a probability q0 that our policy leads to global 
warming which has the consequence that with q1 a person will die. The number of people who 
will die, can only be predicted in terms of probabilities: The probability that N people die is 
given by p0 p1
N in the first, by q0 q1
N in the second case. Thus if p0 >> q0  and p1 and q1 are of 
the same order of magnitude, it is highly likely that in the second case more people will die. 
Although the situation as it was outlined here is by no means related to any real life decision 
situation, the example shows that probabilities are indeed of importance for ethical reasoning  
– one reason being that probabilities (co-)determine the strength of the harm. For simplicity 
we compared decisions, which worst outcomes lead to the same harm. For welfare-based 
theories in which the strength of individual harm and the number of people harmed can be 
                                                           
42 Birnbacher, Dieter, Verantwortung für zukünftige Generationen, 1988, 204 
43 This example is indeed too simplified to reflect by any means the problem encountered in energy politics as in 
particular we are still discussing decisions under risk. 18 
offset against each other via an extremal principle, the extension to situations in which the 
individual harm differs is straightforward.
44 
 
Number of Premises: Furthermore, maximin can be understood as the decision criterion 
of an overly pessimistic actor who is averse to large losses and is willing to forgo attractive 
gains in order to avoid large risks. In situations in which decision maker and people affected 
by the consequences of the decision differ, as it is the case when we are concerned with the 
effects on future generations, the maximin criterion has to make, compared to EUT, additional 
assumptions  on  other  people's  preferences,  that  is  it  assumes  for  example  that  future 
generations are overly risk averse.
45 Nonetheless, extreme risk aversion as well as extremely 
risky behaviour do not seem to be preferences shared by all people in the same way. 
According to the preceding analysis, we hold the opinion that  for decisions under risk a 
probabilistic account is more suitable  – even when one of the decision outcomes endangers 
the future existence of human beings.  The main argument in favor of a probabilistic account 
is  based  on  the  fact  that  determining  the  worst  case  scenario  seems  to  depend  on  the 
numerical values not only of the expected harm. But the numerical values of the frequency 
estimates for the occurrence probabilities of this harm are relevant as well because they may 
relate to the `strength' of the harm, e.g. as they codetermine the number of people harmed. 
Concerning the special form of the probabilistic decision model, we argued that especially 
when we consider long time averages, extreme events far away from the mean might occur 
rather often. The information about how often is entailed in the higher moments. 
 
3. Decisions under uncertainty 
In order to make any probabilistic decision model fruitful for decisions under uncertainty, one 
has to assign `subjective' or `personal' probabilities to those outcomes for which frequencies 
are not known. Such a `closure ansatz' is often referred to as  `Bayesian approach'. More 
sophisticated approaches reintroduce in a second step uncertainty into a closure ansatz: So-
called `second level subjective probabilities' or `higher order beliefs' estimate the reliability of 
the assessed occurrence probability of the various outcomes. 
At first glance, maximin seems to be well suited for decisions under uncertainty: It can 
be applied without introducing additional information in the form of subjective probabilities. 
Therefore, no matter what the expected harm, even authors who prefer EUT for decisions 
                                                           
44 We only want to mention that there might be severe problems related to the assumptionof cardinal harms and 
utilities. 
45 The same criticism applies as well to optimist decision rules or even to the Hurwizc decision rule. 19 
under risk, settle for maximin for decisions under uncertainty.
46 Nevertheless, as for decisions 
under  risk,  maximin  neglects  available  data:  (i)  In  many  decisions  one  cannot  assign 
frequencies to all outcomes, but at least to some. (ii) There might be subjective pr obabilities 
`reliable' enough to be taken into account in moral considerations. 
 
Relevance of probabilities: With respect to the first criticism, imagine, for example, the 
situation where a new drug is the only means against a global epidemic which yields to death 
of a large fraction of the word's population with some rather high probability known via 
frequency estimates. The drug has not yet been tested extensively enough for side effects and 
it cannot be ruled out on the basis of numerical or experimental measurements that the drug, 
for example, causes a change in DNA which might in the long run constitute a major threat 
for the existence of mankind.  Maximin forbids the launch of the drug as the extinction of 
mankind constitutes a bigger harm than the extinction of only a large part of it. But one can 
still argue, that, nonetheless, it might be better to release the drug as the possibility for the 
worst case scenario might in the end be very low. And thus risking the death of so many 
people, that could be saved with rather large probability, seems not to be justifiable. It would 
appear that moral philosophy cannot focus only on the harm of the worst outcome. Rather it 
seems that the strength of the harms of other decision outcomes as well as the numerical 
values of the known probability estimates are relevant for ethical reasoning. 
 
 Frequencies versus subjective probabilities – Incertitude of reliability: Concerning the 
second criticism, it shall be pointed out that an overall preference of frequencies to subjective 
probabilities  does  not  seem  adequate  in  many  cases.  We  deliberately  did  not  follow  the 
terminology  used  in  risk  analysis  and  decision  theory  where  frequencies  pN  are  termed 
`objective' probability. The term frequency is less misleading as there might be too little data 
or the experimental or numerical setting used to determine the frequencies is too simplified in 
order to rely on the frequency approximation for real life situations. Present climate models 
which are incapable of incorporating most of the feedback processes between atmo-, hydro-, 
litho-, kryo-, and biosphere are a  paradigmatic example for the latter. Here frequencies given 
by numerical simulations that make use of oversimplified models might be less reliable than 
an ad-hoc guess of a specialist who might have, during the time he has been working on the 
field, developed an intuitive understanding of how such systems can react. It is crucial for 
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moral philosophy to distinguish between a sophisticated guess by experts and, for example, 
the assumption of uniform probability due to J. Bernoulli's principle of insufficient reason. 
Although frequencies and subjective probabilities differ ontologically, they are treated 
technically in the same way. It is up to moral philosophy to reason about a kind of `threshold' 
indicating  when  to  make  a  `closure  approach',  that  is,  when  to  accept  the  subjective 
probability estimate and treat decisions under uncertainty in the same way as decisions under 
risk, and when to use maximin.
47 This threshold depends on the reliability of the subjective 
probability estimates which depends on many contextual features. The novelty of the methods 
used to assess the probabilities is relevant here: There are, for example, big differences in the 
reliability assessed to the  `risk analysis' of nuclear power plants today and the first  Reactor 
Safety Study of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 1975, the so-called WASH-1400 
or Rasmussen report. The latter was subject to many epistemological  and methodological 
doubts. Later reports incorporated at least some of the critique and thus are at least in some 
aspects more trustworthy than the original Rasmussen report. The evaluation of the reliability 
of information including information on probabilities is not primarily the subject of moral 
philosophy, but rather of epistemology and more applied ethical reasoning concerned with 
one specific problem and is thus not within the scope of this text.
48 
 
4. Decisions under ignorance 
Contrary to decisions under risk and uncertainty, for decisions under ignorance we do not 
actually know all possible outcomes for every decision options. But in practice, at least for 
some  decisions  under  ignorance  one  has  the  choice  between  some  options  of  which  all 
possible outcomes are known and others options of which they are (partly) unknown. This is 
Jonas'  paradigm  where  his  second,  methodological  argument  of  the  `Imperative  of 
Responsibility', namely the `Heuristic of Fear' comes into play.
49 Nonetheless, the maxim to 
                                                           
47 For example, Rawls (Rawls, John,  A Theory of Justice, 1999, 134) and Gardiner (Gardiner, Stephan M., A 
Core Precautionary Principle, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 2005) opt for maximin only if, in addition to 
other premises,  there are no ‘reliable’ estimates of the probabilities. But it is not explicitly discussed by the 
authors, when a probability estimate can be accepted. It rather seems that both authors accept only frequency 
estimates. According to the analysis in themain text, this is not adequate in the context of a future ethics.  In 
general, the term `ignorance' has to be distinguished clearly from the terminology used by Rawls as well as by 
Harsanyi and others in connection with investigations on distributional justice. While in our case `uncertainty' is 
a characteristic feature of real life situations, these authors use it for a normative construction. Furthermore it 
shall be noted that in our terminology Rawls' as well as Harsanyi's `veil of ignorance' establishes a situation 
under uncertainty, not under ignorance. 
48 The problem of incertitude of reliability was, for example, elaborated in great detail, although certainly not 
exhaustively in the form of the philosophical discussion about the nonmilitary use of nuclear power in the 1970s 
and 1980s (Thompson, Paul B., Uncertainty Arguments in environmental issues, Environmental Ethics 8 (1986), 
59-75 // Shrader-Frechette, Kristin S., Nuclear Power and Public Policy, 1980) 
49 Jonas, Hans, The imperative of responsibility: In search of an ethics for the technological age, 1984, 9 21 
avoid, if possible, any action with unknown outcomes because these might constitute a threat 
for the existence of mankind, yields severe consequences. As for example the future course of 
scientific  research  as  well  as  of  technical  progress  is  often  unpredictable,  an  overall 
application  of  this  maxim  yields  a  cessation  of  any  scientific  research  that  could  be 
implemented in technical practice. Furthermore, when dealing with decision under ignorance, 
it is quite often the case that for more than one decision option not all outcomes are known. 
Just imagine being faced with the decision between two global energy polices – one invests in 
conventional energies, the other settles for energy saving measures. Via a possible change of 
climate the former option might have widely unknown consequences, while for the latter it 
might be argued that we cannot know all decision outcomes as we never faced the situation of 
a  large  and  still  growing  world  population  and  thus  cannot  estimate  the  aftermaths  of  a 
significant, global energy saving policy. Thus the maxime to avoid decisions whose outcomes 
are widely unknown cannot account for moral dilemmas as the show up in real life settings. 
 
In order to apply any probabilistic or non-probabilistic decision model to situations under 
ignorance, we have to rely on a closure approach by making additional assumptions. (i) The 
simplest approach ignores unforeseen consequences. This does not seem to be adequate for 
many situations: In the 20th century, the use of new techniques and technologies provided 
examples that some actions lead to unforeseen consequences. The people who in the 1970s 
released CFCs on the market as excellent cleaning and cooling agents can hardly be made 
responsible  for  the  consequences  of  this  launch.  Nowadays  however  we  face  a  different 
situation: The experience with launching CFCs cannot be ignored and now we have to take 
into account that for example releasing new technical achievements might have unforeseen 
consequences. (ii) In cases like the one just mentioned, one might think of providing financial 
funds  for  unpredicted  negative  consequences  occurring.
50  But  problems  arise  when 
determining  the  amount  of  the financial  reserves.  (iii)  A more  sophisticated closure  is 
frequently used in risk analys is: When for a scenario n possible outcomes of a specific 
decision are known, unforeseen consequences can be incorporated by assuming the existence 
of another (n+1)-st outcome which is not and cannot be specified any further.
51 This so-called 
`other scenario'
52  summarizes everything that was not taken into account in the first n 
                                                           
50 e.g. Leitner, Rupert, Responsibility and uncertainty, Newsletter. Akademie-Brief  der Europäischen Akademie 
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outcomes. With this enlarged set of outcomes, one can proceed the same way as for decisions 
under uncertainty.  
 
Settling for option (iii) again leaves us with the question of whether to take a reduction 
approach and treat the decision as if it would be a decision under risk where we argued for a 
probabilistic  decision  model,  or  whether  to  settle  for  maximin.  Again  the  answer  to  this 
question depends on the numerical values and the reliability not only of the known outcomes 
but  of  the  probability  estimates  as  well.  Furthermore,  `information'  on  unforeseen 
consequences which is available in most practical cases seems relevant here. This information 
concerns for example the novelty of the action or its possible influence on complex systems.
53 
 
To  conclude  this  section,  if  an  evaluation  –  that  is  itself  not  under  the  scope  of 
philosophical  ethics,  but  that  is  initiated  by  moral  arguments  –  shows  that  all  subjective 
probability  estimates  for  all  known  consequences  as  well  as  for  `the  other  scenario'  are 
reliable, then we argue for a reduction approach that treats decisions under ignorance and 
uncertainty in the same way as decisions under risk. For decisions under risk we argued for a 
probabilistic  account  that  takes  into  account  higher  moments  and  is  not  restricted  to  the 
expectation  value.  If the subjective probability estimates  seem  unreliable, maximin  is  the 
favorable approach. It shall be stressed that according to the foregoing analysis,  (applied) 
ethical reasoning has to look not only at the strength of the expected harms and benefits as is 
often suggested in the context of a future ethics facing the problem of `uncertainty'. Ethical 
reasoning has rather to take into account also the numerical values of their incident rates as 
well as the ways the occurrence probabilities were generated: via frequency estimates with 
enough data points, with frequency estimates in oversimplified models, as guesses of some 
specialist, ... As we have seen in the case of the anthropogenic greenhouse effect, estimation 
of the long-term consequences of present actions quite often are the result of analysis in many 
different fields. The necessary estimation of the reliability of the accessible forecasts thus 
entails interdisciplinary work that sofar is missing in many fields – most strikingly in our 
example of a possible man-made global warming. 
 
IV. The limits of rule-based approaches 
Although it is not the primary task of moral philosophy to reason about the reliability of 
scientific  forecasts,  it  seems  up  to  ethics  to  provide  the  decision  maker  with  a  kind  of 
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`threshold' that indicates when a reduction approach is appropriate. The problems encountered 
in setting this threshold parallel to some extent the problems encountered when classifying a 
given decision situation as a decision under risk, uncertainty, or ignorance. Here the second 
incertitude of demarcation comes into play. The problems related to the second incertitude of 
demarcation, –  the determination of the decision horizon – are analyzed. Then the first kind 
of  incertitude  of  demarcation,  which  concerns  the  unfinished  list  of  decision  options,  is 
discussed. The problems we will encounter in both subsections can be interpreted in such a 
way that a context-independent approach is not capable of treating certain aspects of decisions 
under `uncertainty' adequately.  A possible solution to this problem is suggested in subsection 
at the end of this section. 
 
1. Setting the decision horizon 
The further the expected outcomes of a decision reach in time, the more severe the problems 
seem  to  be  involving  the  second  kind  of  incertitude  of  demarcation.  As  the  example 
illustrates, there is a plethora of various ways as to how to settle the decision horizon.  
 
Decision theory touches on this problem, although it is not the core of its interest. A 
formal way of how to deal with it was, for example, proposed by Savage. He begins his 
analysis from `the grand world', a hypothetical set Z0 of states of the world that describes the 
decision situation as accurately as possible. Z0  is then divided in classes in such a way that 
states that cannot be distinguished with respect to some criteria relevant for the considered 
decision belong to the same class. The thus obtained partitions Ai  form a new set, Savage's 
`small  world'.
54  The relevant question for tackling the second incertitude of demarcation, 
namely, to state criteria on how to form this partition, is not answered by Savage  or in any 
other  decision  theoretical  approach.
55  Hansson  lists  some  criteria  for  making  such  a 
decision.
56  He illustrates them by the problem of how to combine the different decision 
horizons of various interest groups in the discussion about nuclear waste disposal. We do not 
comment on the guide mentioned by Hansson. We only point out general difficulties which 
arise when one wants to state context-independent criteria to determine the decision horizon. 
It became clear that settling of the second  demarcatio n problem depends on many context-
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dependent aspects, for example: Do some of the actions have similarity with any decision in 
the past? What is the nature of the system our decision is touching on, does it entail feedback 
processes? Answering these questions, we have to take into account that on the one hand it 
speaks  in  favour  of  a  wide  decision  horizon  that  only  thereby  we  can  account  for  the 
complexity  of  the  actual  situation.  On  the  other  hand,  due  to  cognitive  limitations,  wide 
decision horizons are extremely difficult to handle. 
 
2. Handling an unfinished list of options  
In order to account for the first kind of incertitude of demarcation we can distinguish between 
three different approaches: (i) Postponing the decision and hoping that at some later time we 
will know more about possible decision options, (ii) solving the problem permanently now 
although we may have not yet identified most of the possible actions, or (iii) settling for a 
preliminary solution while at the same time looking for further decision options which may 
qualify as solutions for longer periods or even as permanent ones. Approaches (i) and (iii) 
clearly entail demands for more research in the specific field in order to be able to identify yet 
unknown decision options. Alternative (i) is a distinct option only if doing nothing now is not 
yet a `decision by default'. As already stated in section II, this seems quite often not to be the 
case. For example for the anthropogenic greenhouse effect, to wait until the search for further 
courses  of  action  has  been  successful  –  for  example,  a  search  for  more  energy-efficient 
techniques, new ways of energy conversion, or means to absorb greenhouse gases – might 
already undermine the possibility to `solve' the problem of a man-made climate-change at 
some later time. A permanent solution to the climate problem could be to forbid completely 
man-made  emissions  of  greenhouse  gases,  while  a  temporary  reduction  of  emissions  and 
investment,  for  example,  in  research  for  more  energy-efficient  techniques  constitute 
preliminary solutions. The question for moral philosophy is as to how to set on moral grounds 
a kind of `threshold' between the three options (i) --(iii). Again the answer hinges on many 
context-dependent features, for example, on how settling for one specific scenario, restricts 
the number of possible future decisions. Furthermore it might be of importance for how long 
and how extensively alternative decision options  have already been searched for or if there 
have been similar decision situations in the past. 
 
3. Judgment as a supplementation of rules 
According  to  the  analysis  of  the  forgoing  subsections,  with  respect  to  the  incertitude  of 
demarcation a solution detached from contingent features of the decision situation seems to be 25 
out  of  reach.  We  encountered  similar  difficulties  when  we  were  treating  decisions  under 
uncertainty and under ignorance: Although we argued for a general guideline – a probabilistic 
decision model that takes into account higher moments of the probability density, when facing 
decisions under risk – we could not give a general context-independent rule when to settle for 
a  `reduction  approach',  that  is,  when  to  accept  subjective  probability  estimates  and  treat 
decisions under uncertainty or ignorance in complete analogy to decision under risk. The 
analysis in this article thus raises the conjecture that any general rule is doomed to fail in 
treating  adequately  the  problem  of  the  incertitude  of  demarcation.  With  respect  to  the 
colloquial use of the term `uncertainty' M. Luntley notes something similar:  
 
The ethically competent need general rules, but these are not what primarily lie behind 
ethical competence in decision making. Wise judgement is not constituted by grasp of 
general rules, but by the attentional skills for finding salience in the particularities of 
situations. The important element of decision making [...] is the element that turns on the 
possession and operation of these attentional skills.
57 
 
We want to argue that the conceptual skill Luntley mentions should be  identified with  
Aristotle's dianoetic virtue of phronesis
58 as it is used by O. Höffe in the context of an ethics 
of science and technology.
59 But contrary to Luntley who does not distinguish `uncertainties' 
which are different with respect to context (see section II), we hold the opinion that for 
treating the incertitude of consequences adequately, general `rules' of the form given by 
welfare based ethics seem to be required . A synthetic approach, combining welfare based 
ethics and a virtue ethics approach as it shall be sketched in the following, might be able to 
cope with the `uncertainty' of decisions in the full meaning of the word. 
 
Höffe follows the antique understanding of phronesis: Judgement in this context labels a 
certain ability and willingness to identify and to implement the ways and means of how to 
realize a moral norm in real life situations.
60 This antique phronesis as a judgment obliged to 
judge on moral grounds seems to have been diminished with time: In  modernity ethics and 
judgment seem to decouple, judgment becomes equal to a  cleverness which is neutral with 
respect to ethical reasoning. Although this  cleverness  was already known as panurgia in 
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antiquity, it is only in modern times that it seemed to be looked upon favourably.
61  As we 
will  argue  in  the  following,  the  problem  we  face  when  dealing  with  decisions  under 
`uncertainty’,  seem to enforce a reversement of the depotensation of the antique phronesis.  
 
4. Necessity for a Dianoetic Approach 
Not only do the many context-dependant features which seem to be relevant for coping with 
this incertitude of demarcation undermine an overall, context-independent approach in the 
form of general rules. Rather it seems that the complexity often related to the incertitude of 
demarcation implies that quite often only people actually involved with the sometimes rather 
complex prognosis are able to determine the decision horizon and determine how to treat the 
unfinished list of options in such a way that it does justice to problems in the real world.  But 
only by first determining the decision horizon,  a specific decision situation can indeed be 
identified  as  morally  relevant.  If  indeed  only  specialists  who  are  not  experts  on  moral 
philsophy are able to do this, the phronesis is of essential importance: For determining the 
decision  horizon,  for  example,  specialist  knowledge  is  necessary,  but  not  sufficient;  the 
people in possession of the relevant knowledge must also have the ability and willingness to 
determine, for example, the decision horizon on moral grounds.  
 
Thus a first task of the phronesis is to distinguish certain decision situations as ethically 
relevant.  As well as determining the decision horizon, this first task of the phronesis is to 
identify a way of how to deal with an unfinished list of options: This determines whether the 
ethical assessement has to be done right now or if it can wait for a better prognosis. A second 
task  of  the  phronesis  is  the  application  of  (general)  rules.  Thus  the  phronesis  arbitrates 
between general normative rules – as they were, for example, derived in section III – and a 
specific  decision  context.  With  respect  to  decisions  under  uncertainty  or  ignorance,  the 
phronesis is thus in charge of setting in a specific decision context the threshold when to 
accept  a  reduction  approach  and  when  to  settle  for  maximin.  This  second  duty  of  the 
phronesis  parallels,  to  some  extend,  the  duty  that  according  to  Kant  has  to  be  done  by 
judgement, Kant’s `praktische Urteilskraft’.
62 
 
It seems thus that a rehabilitation of an antique dianoetic virtue is capable of solving  
problems that are to some extent genuinly modern. But unlike in in antiquity, where it could 
be expected that everyone with some experience and the relevant knowledge combined with a 
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certain willingness was able to determine on his own how to act morally correctly in a given 
situation, this is not the case when we are confronted with `uncertainties' related to decisions 
that  touch  on  the  remote  future:  First,  the  complexity  makes  it  indispensable  for  moral 
philosophy to provide the moral agent with some general guidelines. Second, the complexity 
of many prognoses makes it not only impossible for the layman to judge by its own; rather the 
nature of the prognoses makes an interdisciplinary assessment inevitable. The example of the 
man-made greenhouse effect shows this paradigmaticly (see fig. 2).  
 
V. Conclusion  
We addressed the question of how ethical reasoning can cope with the ‘uncertainty’ related to 
decisions that touch on future generations by distinguishing two distinct sets of problems: 
 
(i)  Has this ‘uncertainty’ implication for our moral obligations towards futurity?  
  Are due to ‘uncertainty’ some ethical concepts per se inapplicable to a future ethics? 
(ii)  Assuming a moral obligation towards futurity, how can moral norms incorporate the 
‘uncertainty’  that  cannot  be  eliminated  from  real  life  decisions? 
 
Regarding (i) above, for problems that are presently relevant in moral practice, the moral  
obligation towards futurity is not challenged by the ‘uncertainty’ of the existence and of the 
ways of living of future people.  Only special forms of welfare-based approaches, that take 
into account in ethical reasoning all preferences of the people a specific decision touches on, 
are doomed to fail. The latter is of central importance as welfare based approaches seem to be 
most suitable for handling the problems of moral dilemmas which are central in any future 
ethics. 
 
Regarding (ii), we distinguished three kinds of ‘uncertainties’, namely  incertitude of 
reliability, of consequences, and of demarcation . The preceding analysis seems to imply that, 
although the different incertitudes are interrelated, they have to be incorporated in ethical 
reasoning in quite different ways. Coping with the incertitude of reliability is not primary  the 
task  of    moral  philosophy.  Nonetheless,  the  ontological  difference  between  subjective 
probabilities and frequencies was shown to be relvant to ethical reasoning. With respect to the 
incertitude  of  consequences  a  welfare-based  approach  incorporating  elements  of  decision 
theory  that  are  not  restricted  to  the  expected  utility  seemed  well  suited.  Concerning  the 
incertitude of demarcation a general rule -based approach seemed to fail. This lead us to the 28 
conclusion that decisions under `uncertainty' are too complex as that the question of morally 
correct actions can be reduced to one of the aspects that are in the forefront of various ethical 
concepts.  Rather  a synthetic approach that combines aspects  of welfare-based approaches 
with a dianoetic virtue can account for the encountered complexity.  
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